The Assessment and/or Endorsement of Macroeconomic and Fiscal Forecasts as a Core Function of Independent Fiscal Institutions

This paper examines the assessment and endorsement of macroeconomic and fiscal forecasts as a core function of Independent Fiscal Institutions (IFIs) across the European Union. It addresses a set of questions that has so far lacked a common answer: what distinguishes "assessment" from "endorsement," what each entails in practice, and how these functions vary across the Network of EU IFIs.

The paper combines qualitative synthesis with formal statistical analysis. It finds that assessment and endorsement are related but conceptually distinct functions: assessment is generally broader, more informational, and need not be legally mandated, while endorsement is typically a formal, legally embedded procedure culminating in a binding approval decision, often benchmarked against a predefined endorsable range.

Statistical treatment of survey data — using measures of association, principal component analysis, and hierarchical clustering — shows that endorsement and assessment function as alternative modes of institutional engagement rather than sequential stages, and that own-forecast production and formal comply-or-explain leverage are largely independent institutional choices. This yields a five-cluster typology of EU IFIs, from "pure endorsers" to "full-capability assessor-endorsers," indicating that institutional models differ in kind rather than merely in degree of development. The analysis also identifies a persistent set of structural constraints — timely information access, limited scrutiny windows, and constrained analytical capacity — that affect IFIs uniformly, regardless of institutional design.

The paper concludes with a set of best-practice recommendations, targeted by institutional cluster, emphasising in particular the value of formal Memoranda of Understanding with Ministries of Finance, the case for IFIs producing and publishing their own forecasts, and the implementation of the ex post evaluation obligation under Article 4(6) of Directive (EU) 2024/1265. The findings are intended to inform both the practical work of IFIs and the wider academic literature on independent fiscal oversight and forecast accuracy.

The paper draws on a Working Group established within the Network in February 2024, on peer-to-peer exchanges among 17 participating institutions, and on three successive surveys — the last completed by 28 of the Network's 32 members in February 2025.